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No. 20110994

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

JON VAN DE GRIFT, et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.

APPELLEES' ANSWER BRIEF

The State of Utah, the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, and the
Utah Department of Corrections, collectively, "State," submit the
following Answer Brief.

Jurisdiction
This appeal arises from the Plaintiffs', collectively referred to as
"VDG Plaintiffs," suit against the State for damages allegedly caused by
the State's negligence in supervising a parolee and in failing to warn

1
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them about him. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the district
court's final decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102.

Issues Presented
I. Governmental Immunity (Deceit exception)
The governmental immunity act preserves the State's immunity if
the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from deceit. And
Utah courts construe the immunity act to preserve immunity. The VDG
Plaintiffs' damages resulted from a parolee's taking their money in a
Ponzi scheme, in other words, the parolee's deceit. Did the district court
correctly rule that the deceit exception applied to preserve the State's
immunity?
A.

Standard of review:

A district court's decision whether to dismiss claims on grounds of
governmental immunity is a legal determination that this Court
reviews for correctness. Hall v. Utah State Dep't ofCorrs., 2001 UT 34,
f 11, 24 P.3d 958. Moreover, a district court's statutory interpretation
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is a legal question that this Court also reviews for correctness.
Blackner v. Dep't ofTransp., 2002 UT 44, f 8, 48 P.3d 949.
B.

Preservation of issue:

The State raised this issue in its motion to dismiss and supporting
memoranda. R. 32-42, 91-98. The district court granted the motion.
R. 101-105. The district court's written decision is attached as
Addendum A, and the final order is attached as Addendum B.

II. Governmental Immunity (Incarceration exception)
The immunity act also preserves the State's immunity when the
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from the incarceration
of any person in prison or any other place of legal confinement. The
VDG Plaintiffs' injuries were caused by Utah State prison parolee,
Higgins. Higgins was in prison for securities fraud and his parole
conditions included prohibitions on handling others' money and leaving
the state without prior written permission from his parole officer. Can
the district court's ruling on the State's immunity from suit be affirmed
on this alternative ground?

3
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A.

Standard of review:

The standard of review for this issue is the same as that for Issue
I above.
B.

Preservation of issue:

The State raised this issue in its motion to dismiss. R. 32-42, 9198. The district court did not reach the issue, dismissing the case on
the deceit exception. But this Court may affirm the district court on
any ground that is apparent from the record, even though the district
court did not rely on that ground. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 10, 52
P.3d 1158; Dipoma v. McPhee, 2001 UT 61, f 18, 29 P.3d 1225.

III. Governmental Immunity (Motion to dismiss)
The immunity act provides the State immunity from suit, not a
mere liability defense. Here, the complaint's allegations, accepted as
true, establish that the injury arises out of enumerated exceptions to
the waiver of immunity for negligence claims. Did the district court
correctly entertain the State's motion to dismiss?

4
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A.

Standard of review:

The standard of review for this issue is the same as that for Issue
I above.
B.

Preservation of issue:

The VGD Plaintiffs raised this issue in their opposition to the
State's motion to dismiss. R. 43-90.

Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules
The relevant portions of the immunity act, including Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63G-7-301 (5)(b), 5(f), 5(j) are contained in the body of the brief
and are also attached as Addendum C.1

1

The VDG Plaintiffs incorrectly use this portion of their brief to
argue their case. Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(6) requires that determinative
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
should be part of the brief or attached as addenda to the brief. It does
not allow for a discussion of cases, which is more appropriately part of
the argument section.
5
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Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
The VDG Plaintiffs, all out of state residents, sued the State for
negligence. The complaint alleged that the State failed to properly
supervise a parolee that allegedly defrauded the VDG Plaintiffs out of
millions of dollars through a Ponzi scheme. The complaint also alleged
that the State failed to warn the VDG Plaintiffs about the parolee, who
had been in prison for securities fraud. The district court ruled that the
State was immune from suit.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
On April 21, 2011, the VDG Plaintiffs filed their civil suit in the
third district court, Van de Grift, et at. v. State of Utah, et al. case No.
110909827. R. 1-24. The complaint named the state of Utah, the Board
of Pardons and Parole, the Utah Department of Corrections, and several
state employees as defendants.
On May 16, 2011, the State filed a motion to dismiss with
supporting memoranda. R. 32-42. The VDG Plaintiffs opposed the
6
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motion, R. 43-90, and the State replied. R. 91-98. After briefing, the
district court issued its ruling dismissing the complaint. R. 101-105.
Subsequently, the parties stipulated to dismiss the individual
defendants from the case. R. 106-107.
The VDG Plaintiffs timely filed their notice of appeal on
September 28, 2011. R. 110-111.

Statement of Facts
Richard Higgins (Higgins), not a party to this action, was released
from the Utah State Prison on parole in 2005, after serving a five year
sentence for securities fraud and selling securities without a license. R.
5,101. At the time of his release, Higgins entered into a parole
agreement with the State. R. 6. The agreement contained conditions,
which included a prohibition on Higgins leaving Utah without prior
written permission from his parole officer. Id. In addition, Higgins was
not to handle other people's money, was not to be self-employed or be
principal in any company, and not knowingly associate with any person
involved in criminal activity. Id. The complaint alleged that the State
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was to supervise Higgins and ensure that he complied with his parole
agreement. 2 Id.
The VDG Plaintiffs are all out-of-state residents. R. 3-4. They
alleged further that between 2005 and 2009, Higgins and his partners 3
began to mentor investors "under fraud and pretense." R. 6. Allegedly,
Higgins and his partners began soliciting the VDG Plaintiffs, as well as
others, to invest in a real estate venture through a company called
Madison Group. The VDG Plaintiffs began to invest money with
Higgins and his partners "under the false representations" that Higgins
and his partners would manage investments, distribute proceeds, and
maintain buildings. Id. The VDG Plaintiffs allege that Higgins and his
partners began double closing on properties, diverting investors' money
for personal use, refused to pay on returns, failed to do as agreed in
maintaining properties, and did not distribute proceeds. R. 7; see also
Appellants' Opening Brief at p. 7.

2

The individual defendants were dismissed by stipulation. R. 106-

109.
3

Higgins' partners included his son Brandon Higgins and Allan
Christensen.
8
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Allegedly, Higgins' actions resulted in the loss of millions of
dollars of the VDG Plaintiffs'money. R. 6. The VDG Plaintiffs alleged
that the State either knew of Higgins' actions or was negligent in his
supervision. R. 8. After learning of Higgins' fraudulent acts, the Board
of Pardons and Parole revoked his parole. R. 9.

Summary of the Argument
The State retains its immunity from suit when the injuries arise
out of, in connection with, or result from numerous situations. Here,
the deceit exception applies to bar the suit. The deceit exception is
contained with other tortious conduct including assault and battery.
Under the statute's plain meaning and cases interpreting the assault
and battery exception, the status of the tortfeasor is irrelevant when
determining immunity.
Moreover, if the deceit exception were to apply only in the
instance when a state employee committed the deceit, another section of
the statute would be rendered superfluous and without meaning. The
statute expressly retains immunity for the misrepresentation of an

9
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employee, whether negligent or intentional. Eliminating that provision
violates basic statutory construction rules.
The incarceration exception also applies to retain the State's
immunity from suit in this case. The tortfeasor here was on parole after
being in state prison for securities fraud and other crimes. His parole
agreement specifically prohibited him from leaving Utah and from
handling other people's money. The loss of the VDG Plaintiffs' money is
causally connected to the parolee's incarceration in prison and his later
confinement to the state during parole.
Finally, the immunity act provides immunity from suit and not
just a defense to liability. Immunity from suit includes immunity from
the burdens of litigation, including discovery. When a complaint's
allegations establish that the plaintiffs' injuries arise out of, in
connection with, or result from one of the enumerated categories, a
motion to dismiss the suit is appropriate. Otherwise, the State's
immunity from suit is lost.

i
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Argument
I.

The deceit exception to the immunity waiver bars the suit.
The district court correctly ruled that the immunity act bars the

VDG Plaintiffs' suit against the State. Utah courts follow the wellsettled, three-step analysis to determine whether the State retains
immunity from suit. Johnson v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 2006 UT 15, "ft
17,133 P.3d 402; Wagner v. State, 2005 UT 54, f 12,122 P.3d 599;
Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist, 849 P.2d 1162,1164 (Utah 1993).
Here, the challenge is limited to the third step - whether an exception
to the waiver applies to retain the State's immunity. The district court
ruled that the act barred the VDG Plaintiffs' suit because their injuries
arose out of, in connection with, or resulted from deceit. The district
court's application of the deceit exception was correct.
The VDG Plaintiffs do not dispute that their injuries resulted from
the tort of deceit.4 But they contend that the deceit exception is

4

In Utah, the tort of deceit consists of five elements: l."a false
representation of fact;" 2. the defendant knew or believed the
representation was false; 3. an intention to induce the plaintiff "to act or
refrain from acting" in reliance on the representation; 4. justifiable
reliance by the plaintiff on the representation in taking action or in
11
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narrowly confined to only those cases where a government employee
committed the tort. Their construction is not supported and should be
rejected.
A.

Plain statutory language supports the district court's
interpretation of the deceit exception.

The controlling provision here, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301 (5)(b),
confers immunity when the injuries arise out of several kinds of tortious
conduct:
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not
waived . . . if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or
results from:
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process,
libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights,
infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights.

(Emphasis added). Utah's courts have consistently acknowledged the
necessity of governmental immunity in protecting the delivery of vital
governmental services. And statutory wording is strictly construed
when necessary to preserve immunity. Hall, 2001 UT 34 at f 14; see

refraining from it; and 5. damages suffered a result. Bennett v. Jones
Waldo Holdbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, f 74, 70 P.3d 17.
12
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also, Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996);
Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976).
This Court has interpreted the assault and battery exception on
many occasions. See e.g., Wagner, 2005 UT 54; Sanders v. Leavitt, 2001
UT 78, f 29, 37 P.3d 1052; Taylor, 927 P.2d at 164; SH ex rel. RH v.
State, 865 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
231 (Utah 1993); Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1164. In some of those cases,
plaintiffs made the same argument that the VDG Plaintiffs make here,
that in order for the exception to apply, the government employee must
have committed the tort. This Court rejected those arguments and has
consistently held that "the status of the assailant who committed the
assault or battery is irrelevant under our long-accepted interpretation
of the Act

" Sanders, 2001 UT 78 at f 29. The conclusion is based

on the statute's plain language because subsection 301(5)(b) does not
contain language that confines immunity to cases in which a
government employee commits the tort. See Taylor, 927 P.2d at 164.

13
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In Taylor this Court stated that "[i]n the codification of the assault
exception, '[n]othing suggests that the one committing the assault need
be a governmental employee.' Thus, applying the exception strictly to
preserve sovereign immunity, its protective sweep must be applied to
include assaults committed by nongovernment assailants." Id.
Similarly, in Higgins, the plaintiff argued that the exception did
not preserve immunity for injuries arising from an assault or battery if
the assailant was not a government employee. Higgins, 855 P.2d at
240. This Court found the argument was "without merit" and that
immunity was preserved by the statute's "plain language." Id. The
Court held further that the "statute simply does not contain the
distinction on which Higgins stakes her claim. In fact, its language
suggests that 'the legislature contemplated no such

distinction.'"Id.

(emphasis added).
The reasoning of those cases applies equally here because the
torts of deceit and battery are listed in the same provision. See, e.g. Sill
v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, f 7, 162 P.3d 1095 (statutory terms interpreted in
harmony with other provisions in the same statute and as a whole).

14
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There is simply no authority or statutory language that supports a
different interpretation for deceit. Thus, under the statute's plain
language, the deceit perpetrator's status is irrelevant.
To be sure, this Court has criticized the immunity act's reach from
time to time. But the Court has also recognized that "the legislature
has spoken with clarity on the question of immunity," and thus this
Court is "constrained by the plain language of the Act and [by] prior
case law on this point." Taylor, 927 P.2d at 169 (Durham, J.,
dissenting); Sanders, 2001 UT 78,11 44 , 37 P.3d 1052,1062 (Durham, J.
concurring); Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1167; see also S.#.,865 P.2d at 1365
and at 1366 (Hall, C.J., dissenting); Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 504
(Utah 1996); Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144,1147 (Utah 1994). It is
therefore not for the VDG Plaintiffs to tailor the State's waiver of
immunity more narrowly to incorporate a condition that is not part of
the statutory language. That is a task reserved for the Utah State
Legislature. This Court should affirm the district court's order granting
the State's motion to dismiss and dismissing the VDG Plaintiffs'
complaint with prejudice.

15
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B.

The district court's interpretation complies with rules
of statutory construction.

The district court's interpretation of the deceit exception comports
with well-accepted rules of statutory construction. When interpreting a
statute, courts "seek to give effect to the purpose and intent of the
legislature." Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, f 22, 212 P.3d 547. And when
conducting a textual analysis, the court considers the literal meaning of
each term and avoids constructions that would render portions of the
statute superfluous or inoperative. Id.; Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove
City, 2007 UT 84, f 9, 173 P.3d 166. Indeed, the statute is construed to
give effect to all of the statutory terms because the Court "assumes the
legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its
ordinary meaning." Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT
50, f 14, 267 P.3d 863.
Significantly here, in addition to providing immunity for injuries
caused by deceit, the act provides immunity when injuries result from
"a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or
intentional. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(f). Deceit is the "action or

16
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practice of deceiving someone by concealing or misrepresenting the
truth." Oxford English Dictionary, available at
www. oxfordictionaries. com. If the deceit exception is limited to only
circumstances where the government employee commits the tort,
subsection (f)'s exception for misrepresentation by an employee is
superfluous and has no meaning. A narrow construction of the deceit
exception violates that basic rule of statutory construction.

G.

Interpretation of other sections does not undermine
the district court's interpretation of the deceit
exception.

The district court did not err in its interpretation of the deceit
exception. And interpretation of other immunity sections does not
undermine the court's ruling. Notably, this Court held that for a correct
interpretation of the permit exception to the immunity waiver, the
"government entity claiming immunity must have" acted to issue or
failed to issue the permit, or license or other order. Francis v. State,
2010 UT 6 2 , 1 15, 248 P.3d 44. But that case was construing § 63G-7301(5)(c), not subsection (b). The VDG Plaintiffs cite no authority for
the proposition that Francis's construction of subsection 301(5)(c)
17
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applies to subsection 301(5)(b). Nor do they identify language in
subsection 301(5)(b) that would justify a similar interpretation. To the
contrary, as discussed above, the cases interpreting subsection 301(5)(b)
have consistently held that the status of the actor is irrelevant under
subsection 301(5)(b) and that the plain language of subsection 301(5)(b)
warrants this result. Nothing in Francis indicates that those decisions
have been overruled.

D.

The district court's application of the act to preclude
all of the claims was correct.

The district court correctly dismissed all of the VDG Plaintiffs'
claims based on the immunity act. It matters not the theory of liability
pleaded or the number of alterative theories or grounds of liability that
the VDG Plaintiffs make. The governmental immunity act specifically
states that immunity is retained if the "injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from" an enumerated category. Id. § 63G-7301(5) (emphasis added).
The legislature's use of the term injury, instead of claim, is
significant. "The determinant of immunity is the type of conduct that
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produces the injury." Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1166 (emphasis added).
Unlike the Federal Torts Claim Act, which immunizes the federal
government from claims that arise out of categories, Utah's immunity
act immunizes the state for injuries. See id. Thus, if there is a "but for"
causation between one of the exceptions and plaintiffs' injury, the
state's immunity is retained. And this Court has consistently rejected
attempts to circumvent immunity by careful pleading or crafting of
theories of liability, or by pleading alternative claims. Id. at 1166;
Taylor, 927 P.2d at 164. In other words, the allegations of negligence theories of liability - against the government entity are immaterial.
"Such allegations [are] merely 'attempts to evade the statutory
categories by recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury.'"
Taylor, 927 P.2d at 164 (quoting Tiede, 915 P.2d at 502).
Even if a particular claim is in no way related to an exception to
the immunity waiver, that claim may still be precluded, if the injury for
which the plaintiff seeks redress is causally related to the exception.
The district court correctly recognized this. Thus, although the VDG
Plaintiffs' "failure to warn" and "failure to supervise" claims may have
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nothing to do with the deceit exception,5 the injury for which they seek
redress, the loss of their investments, does. Therefore all of the claims
are barred.
The VDG Plaintiffs cite Doe v. Argueles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985),
to support their contention that the district court erred. But that
decision does not apply here because it addressed only discretionary
function immunity and did not mention, much less construe, the
immunities at issue here. Thus, Argueles may be instructive on
discretionary function immunity, but it offers nothing to support the
VDG Plaintiffs here. The district court correctly applied an exception
to the waiver of immunity to dismiss all of the VDG Plaintiffs' claims.

II.

The incarceration exception also bars the suit.
The district court dismissed the case based on the deceit exception

and did not reach the incarceration exception. But this Court may
affirm the district court on this alternative ground. Bailey, 2002 UT 58
at HIO.
5

The same is true of the incarceration exception, discussed below
in section II.
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Section 301(5)(j) retains the State's immunity if the injuries arise
out of, in connection with, or result from "the incarceration of any
person in any state prison . . . ." The VDG Plaintiffs' injuries are the
loss of their investment money due to parolee Higgins' fraud. Higgins
was in the Utah State Prison for securities fraud and related charges.
R. 5, 101. When he was paroled in 2005, he was prohibited from
handling other people's money and from leaving the state without prior
written permission from his parole officer. R. 6.
Those allegations show that the VDG Plaintiffs' claims are also
barred by the incarceration exception. This Court has broadly
interpreted the phrase "arises out of and has found that it plainly
requires "only that there be some causal nexus between the risk and the
resulting injury." Blackner, 2002 UT 44, <l 15 (citing Taylor, 927 P.2d at
163). In another case involving the incarceration exception, this Court
reiterated that the phrase "arising out of is "very broad, general, and
comprehensive," and that the phrase "imports a concept of causation"
which this Court has long since concluded means "originating from,
incident to, or connected with the item in question." Peck v. State, 2008
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UT 39,1[ 11, 191 P.3d 4 (citing Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163 and quoting
Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d
961, 963 (Utah 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Peck
court examined the other terms set out in the statute's "broad
introductory phrase," id. f 12, and determined that "in connection
with" and "'results from'. . . similarly connote a causal link between the
injury and the government activity for which sovereign immunity has
not been waived." Id. f 11. The Court concluded that "any injury that
is caused by or originates from [the enumerated conduct] falls within
the . . . exception." Id.
In Peck, the plaintiff sued the state for negligently allowing him to
fall on his face while he was being physically restrained by a Utah
Highway Patrol trooper. Id. f 1. Peck fell after he had been arrested
and handcuffed, but before the trooper could place him in a police
cruiser to be transported to jail. Id. This Court held that Peck's claim
was barred because there was a causal connection between Peck's
injury and his incarceration in a place of legal confinement; that Peck's
injury arose out of his incarceration; and that his claim therefore fell
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within the "plain language of Utah Code section 63-10-10(10) (1997).
Id.
The incarceration exception requires that a person be under the
state's control when the injury occurs. In Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242,
243 (Utah 1976), the court held that the State would be immune if a
convict who escaped a work release program was "still under the control
of the prison authorities so that his conduct would 'arise out of the
incarceration of any person in (the) state prison . . . .'" Accord, Kirk v.
State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1989) (holding that death caused by
an escaped prison inmate arose out of incarceration in a state prison).
Most recently in Whitney v. Div. ofJuv. Justice Servs., 2012 UT
12,1[ 20, - P.3d - , this Court held that a juvenile placed in a non-secure
community-based proctor home was not incarcerated in a "place of legal
confinement" for purposes of the incarceration exception. The Court
held that the exception requires some kind of physical or spacial
restriction. Id. at "fl 17.

6

The exception was formerly codified in that section.
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The VDG Plaintiffs here all live in states other than Utah. R. 3-4.
They alleged that the parolee who defrauded them was under the
State's supervision and control. R. 6. He was in prison for securities
fraud. And a specific condition of his parole prohibited him from
leaving Utah without prior written permission from his parole officer.
R. 6. Applying Peck, Epting, and Whitney to the complaint's allegations
here, the VDG Plaintiffs' injuries arose out of, in connection with, or
resulted from Higgins' incarceration because he was confined in prison
and then allegedly continued to be under the State's control, through
parole conditions and spacial restrictions, when he defrauded them. 7
This Court may affirm the district court's order dismissing the case on
this alternative ground.

7

Below, the VDG Plaintiffs cited a failed amendment as evidence
that incarceration immunity does not apply to injuries caused by
parolees. But that reliance is misplaced. See, 2A Sutherland Statutory
Construction, 48:18 (7th ed.). Because "[ajction on a proposed
amendment is not a significant aid to interpretation of an act that was
passed years before," id., the failed amendment should not carry any
weight. Moreover, legislative history is irrelevant because the plain
language of the incarceration provision is unambiguous.
24
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III. The district court properly considered the immunity act in
the State's motion to dismiss.
The district court did not err by entertaining the State's motion to
dismiss. And this Court should reject the argument that the motion to
dismiss was premature. Governmental immunity is an immunity from
suit and not just a defense to liability. Mecham v. Frazier, 2008 UT 60,
f 13, 190 P. 3d 630. That kind of immunity gives the State the right to
avoid the "burdens of litigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 52627 (1985). The State would lose that right if an immunity-based motion
to dismiss could be deemed premature.
Moreover, a motion to dismiss properly raises an affirmative
defense if "the complaint itself set [s] forth everything necessary to
satisfy the affirmative defense. . . ." Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med.
Ctr., Inc., 2005 UT App. 325, \ 6, 122 P.3d 891. If a complaint alleges
facts showing that the State is immune, the case should be dismissed
under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See also S.H., 865 P.2d at 1364,1365;
Peck, 2008 UT 39, f 2 (state's interlocutory appeal from denial of a
motion to dismiss). Here, it was proper for the district court to
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entertain the State's motion to dismiss because the immunity
arguments were based solely on the complaint's allegations.

Conclusion
The district court's order dismissing the VDG Plaintiffs' complaint
was correct. The suit is barred by both the deceit and incarceration
exceptions to the State's waiver of immunity for negligence. This Court
should affirm the district court in all respects.
Dated this 4 ^ . day of April, 2012.

PEGGY K STONE
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah, Board of
Pardons and Parole, and Department of
Corrections

i
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
JON VAN DE GRIFT, etal,

RULING ON
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 110909827
v.
Judge Paul G. Maughan
STATE OF UTAH, et al,
Date: May 2,2011
Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. Though Defendants have
requested a hearing on this Motion, the Courtfindsthat the issues have been authoritatively decided and
no hearing is necessary. Having fully considered the memoranda, the Court finds that the Motion must
be GRANTED.
The Plaintiffs allege that the State of Utah, its departments, officials and employees did not
adequately supervise parolee Richard Higgins. Specifically, Higgins was previously incarcerated for
securitiesfraudand selling unregistered securities without a license. He was released in March 2005.
As conditions of his parole, Higgins was not to leave the State without prior written permission from
his probation officer, was not to handle other people's money, was not to be self-employed or a principal
in any company, and was not to knowingly associate with any person involved in criminal activity or
convicted of a felony. The Defendants were to supervise Higgins. Higgins violated these conditions,
orchestrating a Ponzi scheme which defrauded the Plaintiffs out of money. On or about February 7,
2008, the Plaintiffs informed the Defendants of Higgins' activities. Higgins' parole was revoked. The
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have blocked their efforts to discover facts about Higgins* illegal
activities which would suggest liability on the part of the Defendants for negligent supervision, failure
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to warn, and failure of policy, customs and/or procedures of the Defendants.
The Plaintiffs have brought claims against the Defendants for (1) Negligent Supervision; (2)
Gross Negligence; (3) Failure to Warn and (4) Negligent Misrepresentation.I The Defendants argue that
they are immune from suit. Specifically, the Defendants say that the State of Utah, Utah Board of
Pardons and Parole, and Department of Corrections are immune because the Plaintiffs' damages arise
out of three immune situations - deceit, misrepresentation, and incarceration in a state prison. The
remaining Defendants are allegedly immune because the Complaint alleges only that they acted in the
scope of their employment.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §63G-7-301(4), "[i]mmunityfromsuit of each governmental
entity is waived as to any injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee
committed within the scope of employment." All of the Plaintiffs' allegations assert that the
governmental entity or agency was negligent in some manner because of the conduct of their employees.
There is also no dispute that all of the employee defendants were acting in the scope of their
employment when the committed these allegedly negligent acts. Thus, it appears at first blush that
governmental immunity has been waived here. However, "[i]mmunityfromsuit of each governmental
entity is not waive . . . if the injury arises out, in connection with, or results from:.. . deceit;... a
misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional; [or]... the incarceration
of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement"

1

The Plaintiffs have also asserted a claim for Respondeat Superior. This does not state a
separate basis for relief. Instead, it is pled as a.method to hold the entity defendants liable for
actions of their employees.
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The Plaintiffs* first three causes of action "arise[] out" of Higgins' deceit.2 "In ordinary usage,
the words * arises out of import a concept of causation. The term 'arising out of is ordinarily
understood to mean originatingfrom,incident to, or connected with the item in question

Thus, for

[the Defendants] to be immune from liability for [the Plaintiffs'] injuries, the injuries must have had
some causal link to the [deceit]." Taylor v. Ogden School Dist., 927 P,2d 159,163 (Utah 1996). It is
clear from the Complaint that the harmed caused to the Plaintiffs has some causal link to Higgins'
deceit. Though the Plaintiffs argue that the harm arosefromthe Defendants' failure to supervise, etc.
Higgins, the appellate courts have rejected similar attempts to "recharacteriz[e] the supposed cause of
injury." See, e.g., Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144,1146-47 (Utah 1994).
The Plaintiffs'finalcause of action is for Negligent Misrepresentation. The Plaintiffs allege that
the Defendants have negligently misrepresented or withheld information regarding Higgins' supervision.
This is also a claim for which the Defendants are immunefromsuit. As noted above, the government
has not waived its immunity for misrepresentations by employees whether or not they are negligent or
intentional.
The Court rejects the Plaintiffs' argument that claims of governmental immunity are affirmative
defenses, not appropriately raised in a motion to dismiss. Because the Court can determine that the
Defendants are immune based solely on the facts in the Complaint, it is appropriate for the Defendants
to seek dismissal. Further, governmental immunity is commonly addressed in motions to dismiss. See,
e.g., Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39,191 P.3d 4 (reversing the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss
2

Because the Court finds that these causes of action arose from a "deceit," the Court does
not consider the Defendants' alternative argument that the causes of action arose from Higgins'
incarceration.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

VAN DE GRIFT V STATE

PAGE 4

RULING

based Upon governmental immunity).
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED.
SO ORDERED this j r £ day of July,

Judge P
Third
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REED STRINGHAM (Utah Bar No. 4679)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (Utah Bar No. 4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
Tel: (801) 366-0100
Email; rstringham@utah.gov
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY

Jon Van de Grift, et al,
Plaintiffs

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS1
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.

Case Number: 110909827

State of Utah, et al,

Judge: Paul G. Maughan

Defendants

Defendants State of Utah, Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, Utah Department of
Corrections, Michael R. Sibbett, Donald E. Blanchard, Jesse Gallegos, Curtis L. Garner, Cheryl
Hansen, and Stephen Tebben moved to dismiss this action with prejudice. The parties filed
supporting and opposing memoranda, and the motion was submitted for decision. On July 29,
2011, the Court granted the motion based on those memoranda and the applicable authority, and
for the reasons stated in its July 29,2011 Ruling on Motion to Dismiss. Since that time, the
parties have additionally stipulated to dismiss with prejudice the individual defendants Michael
R. Sibbett, Donald E. Blanchard, Jesse Gallegos, Curtis L. Garner, Cheryl Hansen, and Stephen
Tebben during the pendency of any appeal and thereafter. That stipulation has been submitted to
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the Court and will now be so ordered.
It is therefore ordered that Defendants' Motion To Dismiss is granted, and that this action
is dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this

day of

, 201I.

BY THE COURT

HONORABLE PAUL G, MAUGHAN
Third District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Marcus R. Mum lord
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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§63G-7-202

GENERAL GOVERNME]Srr

Note 17
basis of governmental immunity, and prison officials pleaded defense of immunity in their answer to amended complaint in constitutional
action. U.C.A. 1953, 63-30-4(3, 4). Bott v. DeLand, 1996, 922 P.2d 732. Appeal And Error
<&=> 179(1)

cient detail to permit appellate review, w ^
district court stated that? it granted surtima^
judgment to one, defendant because plaint^
failed to timely file his lawsuit and it g r a t ^
summary judgment to other two defendants k
e
cause itdefendant,
determined
a previously
missed
theythat,
werelike
entitled
to <w d- "

18. Review
,
.District court's order revealed the basic
grounds upon which it relied to grant summary
judgment to defendants, and thus included suffi-

mental immunity. Rules Civ.Proc, R u i e ^(^
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Cents
Inc./2003, 70 P.3d 904, 473 Utah Adv. R e p $%
2003 UT 23. Appeal And Error to 856(1)
<

_-..

:SS%*

§ 6 3 G ^ 7 - 2 0 3 . Exemptions for certain talrings actions .
An action that involves takings law, as defined in Section 63L-3-102, &
subject to the requirements of Sections 63G-7-401, 63G-7-402, 63G-7"
and63G-7-601. Laws 2008, a .582/1 1495, eft May 5, 2008.
Prior Laws:
Laws 2004, c. 267, § 50

Historical and Statutory Notes
Laws 2007, c. 306, § 70.
C. i953, ! § 63-30d-203.

PART 3. WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY
§ 63G-7-301.

Waivers of immunity—Exceptions

(l)(a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived^a
l
contracmial obligation.
'
.. ,T<:
> "•• (b) Actions-arising but of contractual rights or obligations are :fl[^fflfc
"to the requirements of Sections 63G-7-401, 63G-7-402,: 6 3 G - M ) ^
• 63G-7-601
- - - ; "
' •' :
-• '
Mm^s
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for failure to d e f e ^
from a reservoir or associated facility authorized by Title 73, Cha*
Bear River Development Act, if the failure to delh/er the c o n t r a d ^ ^ r
of water Is due to drought, other natural condition, or safety caiy" «
causes a deficiency in the amount of available water.
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived?
^
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession of, or
to real or personal property;
•
:
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or other, i f t ^
or personal property^ to determine any adverse claim on r e * t h e ^ | j
property, or to obtain an adjudication about any mortgage or
^ ' ^
the governmentar entity may have or claim on real or pers^
^
-(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction, d a ^ s ^ ^
goods, merchandise, or other property while it is in the^P ^ ^
^
W
governmental entity or employee, if the property was seiz«
of forfeiture under any provision of state law;
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(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is ne*le
intentional;
eug e n t

0r

•(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob v,u
virile
civil disturbances;
ience, and
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes;
v
' ••••" (i) the activities of the Utah National' Guard;
• ••••;
0) the incarceration of any person inT any-state prison, county or
.<*,
or other place of legal confinement;
T5r;,f
*\
|
^°rc%jail,
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands' ; ( / ) any condition existing in connection with an' abandoned •
mining operation;
?!
.4.1 ;
, u u n e a mine 0 r

ui

li

(m) any activity authorized by the' Schooled^Institutional T W T
ds
Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire, ancf StateLands(n) the operation or existence of a pedestrian or equestrian'trail * • •
along^a ditch, canal, s t r e a m e r river, regardless of ownership or o p e a S f 1
the ditch, canal, stream, or river; if: .
"Juration of
(i) the trail is designated under a general plan adopted by a mutoaLf*
under Section 10-9a-401 or by, a county under Section
S S ?
(11) the trail right-of-way or the'right-of-way where the trail . ^ l £ ! ^
open to public use as evidenced by a written agreement between t h f S l l
or operator of the trail right-of-way, 0 r of the right-of-way where S f S l ill ill
• located, and the municipality or county, where the. t r a g i c a l 7 * * ® * K i l l
(iii) the written agreement:
'. .
.
%i •.
(A) contains a plan for operation and maintenance of the' tfal
• (B) provides that an owner or operator of the trail right-oft
the right-of-way Where the trail is located has, at m i n i m u m , ^
lev^ptimmumtyfromsuit.as the governmental entity in connect
or resulting from the use of the trail.
• ' , . ' . •
(o) research or implementation of cloud management
or seeding*:
b
B
clearing of fog;
: (p) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural d e t e r s *
(q) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systenV'•%
. . (r) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven,.in a<?
dance with the requirements of Section 41-6a-212;
','""'..,'."
'
!
(s) the activities of:
'
'•''""
W providing emergency medical assistance;
;=.
•
(ii) fighting fire;
...
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
ous wastes;
,
(iv) emergency evacuations;
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where
cy medical assistance can be rendered or where the person can
ported by a licensed ambulance service; or
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies;
1076
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(&) subject to Subsection 63G-7-302(l), as to any action brought under the
Authority of Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, for the recovery of
Ampensation from, the governmental entity when the governmental entity
^as taken or damaged private property for public uses without just compention;

' •

•.•-•..

..•• ' v . - - - . . .

:.- -,.

ie) subject to Subsection 63G-7jf302(2),, a& to any action brought to recover
orney fees,ujider Sections 6 3 | J - 2 T 4 0 5 and 63G-2-802;
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah Protection of
Hie Employees Act; ^ r ,Q ^ ; / , /r.:.:,-..,; f:" 4. .. • . .
g) as to an^taqtionhrpi;g]at to obtain relief from a land use regulation that
Doses a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion under Title 63L,
;gpter 5, Utah I^Ugious l^i^drUse,Act. , ; / . ; , ; .
(,
{ )(a) Except asiprpyided in Subsection•;($)(&)>; immunity from suit of each
lental entity is waived a$ to any injury caused by; . , .
.
.
oi:(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangettxus? icon^lition of any) highway, - road,
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert; tunnel, bridge, viaduct, brother
ructure located on them; or v . n ^ r,•';'-.A;** » • >tQxur<
.. )-iv\i • \..)
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public buildiilg, structure,
a>rr;es$s~yoir, or other publicamprpyement.
•.;>. -...,
-<
^ Immunitycfoom< stiit of each governmentalventity, is not waived if the
;juryi arises o u t / o f ^ i ^
':>.>..*
u
.(i)'a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any ihighway>doad,
?
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,.tunnel, -bridge, viaduct, or other
5jsti&ctoe*located ontfee^ G prb r ^ ti ( , g ; r< , - j ' ^ . :<-•
v.. (U^/a latent dangei^us. ,op4^ten& defective condition, of any-public build*ing, structure, dam, regervoj^^-or othe^ public imprpvement. ,: r!
t4) Immunity frbiii suit of eacfcgo^rnme^al entity ik Waived ^
injury
proximately caused by a negligent act dr dMiission: of ari; employee committed
within the scope of employment. ; ' > 1 ^ 9 1 :
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived under
Subsection^ (3) and (4) if the injury arises but of, in connection with, or results
from: . •••";'• :.w--; '
* "••
" ' v — . A - ' - • >- ••••• r
(a) the ecktercise or performance, or th& failure to exercise oi* perform, a
discretionary function, whether or n6t the discretion is abused; !
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit; interference with
contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights;
(e)lthe issuance, denial/suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate,
a
Pproval, order, or similar authorization;
(d) a failure to make an inspection;or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection;
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause;
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(t) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, any
function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 10, Board of,Water Resources—
Division of Water Resources r or
^'(u) unauthorized access to government records, data, or electronic information systems by any person or entity.
• 2080?,c. 382, § ,1496, eff. May 5, 2008.
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